From Territorial to Ethnographic Colonies and Back Again: 
The Politics of Italy’s Demographic Expansion, 1890-1912

by Mark I. Choate, Brigham Young University
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Abstract:

For Italy, unprecedented mass migration in the late nineteenth century overshadowed the European Scramble for Africa. To secure Italy’s place in the new imperial order, Francesco Crispi proposed to harness emigration for colonial expansion, by settling Italy’s East African colonies with the surplus Italian population. Defeat at Adwa in 1896 shattered Crispi’s project, and turned attention to colonial possibilities elsewhere. Luigi Einaudi and other Liberals trumpeted the value of Italian collectivities or colonie across the Atlantic, where Italy exerted only indirect influence. In theory, these ‘spontaneous colonies’ would boost the Italian economy at little expense. Italian colonialist societies turned from Africa to the Americas, working to make Italian migration more prestigious, successful and profitable. After 1908, however, Enrico Corradini and the Italian Nationalists mocked these initiatives, and called upon the Italian state to return to traditional imperialism in Africa.

Full Text:

In the late nineteenth century, many Italian Liberals associated colonialism with population settlement. This simple linkage reflected Italy’s stringent circumstances.

Unlike France and Britain, the new Kingdom of Italy lacked the capital resources to sponsor and develop plantation colonies for economic exploitation. What Italy did not lack was population. In the decades after unification, Italy was one of the most densely populated countries in Europe, and soon produced the continent’s largest emigration. For centuries Italian laborers had sought work in neighboring countries, but under the pressure
of industrialization and changing markets, transatlantic emigration skyrocketed. Between 1878 and 1881, Italy’s annual migration to the Americas doubled from twenty to forty thousand; it doubled again by 1886, then doubled again in 1891 and again in 1904, with over half a million Italians emigrating in 1906 and 1913. With the rise of steamship travel, transatlantic migration became faster, cheaper and safer than ever before.

What consequences would mass migration bring for Italy’s future? Optimists regarded the expansion of emigrants across the globe as a successful type of colonialism—indeed, often more successful than Italy’s attempts to occupy and pacify lands in Africa. This definition of population movement as colonial expansion became an enduring interpretive nexus, supported by Italy’s colonialist institutions and politicians. For example, in 1915 the president of the Italian Colonial Institute, Ernesto Artom, announced that his group supported the development of Italy’s territorial possessions, the so-called ‘colonies of direct dominion’, and also her expatriate settlements, or ‘population colonies’:

[by] constituting an organization among the population colonies in the great ethnographic empire, which our people could have in the world, replacing the divided Italic members with a powerful vital organism, pulsing with the heartbeat of a vigorous national life; [and by] preparing our country for colonial life in the colonies of direct dominion, addressing the principal problems of our possessions of Libya, Eritrea, and Benadir.
The Colonial Institute hoped to tie together all the Italian settlements scattered throughout the world. Colonies would organize on a local level, with mutual aid societies and local charities; internationally, the colonies would exchange imports and exports. The mother country, in turn, would benefit as the center of a global cultural and economic network.\(^6\)

Such an ‘ethnographic empire’, conquered through the peaceful toil of emigrant laborers rather than the blood of colonial troops, held enduring appeal for Italian Liberals. Yet the alternative vision of settling Italians in ‘colonies of direct dominion’ in Africa, following in the footsteps of the ancient Roman Empire, promised more glory and prestige. This article will outline the continual debate over Italian migration and colonialism, with its political and cultural consequences up to the Libyan War.

**Colonialism as population expansion**

Italians linked colonialism with population well before the European Scramble for Africa. Leone Carpi was one of the first to study Italian colonialism, publishing four tomes on the topic in 1874.\(^7\) He observed that the Italian word *colonia* referred to settlements of emigrants in foreign countries, and also to overseas possessions. Based on this definition, Carpi proposed that emigration itself was a form of colonial expansion. He argued that permanent migration, especially to South America, was more profitable to Italy than seasonal migration at harvest-time to neighboring European countries. While temporary migrants brought home a few months’ wages, permanent Italian settlements
expanded Italy’s opportunities for long-term trade and representation overseas.

These ideas developed into concrete policies under the direction of Francesco Crispi, who as prime minister in 1887 called for a new approach to emigration:

The [Italian] Government . . . must never lose sight of [emigrants] in their new home . . . . Colonies must be like arms that the country extends far away in foreign districts, to bring them within the orbit of its relations of labor and exchange; they must be like an enlargement of the boundaries of its action and its economic power.8

By cultivating emigrants as Italian agents abroad, Crispi aimed for a grand foreign policy, using Italy’s population as a strength rather than a burden. Like Carpi, Crispi referred to groups of expatriates in Buenos Aires, Sao Paolo, New York, Tunis, and other places as Italian colonies. He hoped to reach Italians and their children born abroad by teaching them in Italian-language schools, helping them through subsidized Italian charities, and protecting them through an invigorated consulate system.9

Crispi went beyond support for emigrants abroad, to scheme for a means to keep them ‘under the flag’ and under the protection of the Italian government. Instead of facing exploitation and racist persecution in the Americas, would-be emigrants could settle in Italian colonies in Africa. By moving population out of Italy into African settlements, Crispi proposed a new social ‘safety valve’ without the embarrassments of transatlantic
migration. Domestic problems, including low wages, underdevelopment, and the threat of revolution, could all be resolved while strengthening the country’s presence in Africa.\textsuperscript{10} Though Crispi had opposed the Eritrean expedition of 1885, in 1890 as prime minister he presented a new vision to the Italian Parliament:

What is our purpose in Eritrea? Our purpose is the institution of a colony that can accommodate that immense emigration which goes to foreign lands, placing this emigration under the dominion and laws of Italy; our purpose is also to do everything that can help our commerce and the commerce of the country we have occupied.\textsuperscript{11}

Crispi claimed that the settlement of East Africa would be in the best traditions of the conquering and colonizing Roman legions.\textsuperscript{12} His designs in East Africa also furthered his goals in Great Power politics, by cutting off the expansion of French Djibouti along the Red Sea coast, but demographic settlement was the selling point for Italy’s Parliament. In the 1890s, the Chamber of Deputies funded the settlement of several pilot communities in Eritrea, under the guidance of Leopoldo Franchetti.\textsuperscript{13}

But Franchetti came into fundamental conflict with the Italian colony’s military government, especially under Governor-General Oreste Baratieri, who rashly advanced Italian troops into Sudan and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{14} The conquest promised a long-term role for the army, but Franchetti saw that war with the Ethiopian Empire would ruin his civilian settlements; the colony needed peace and consolidation. Frustrated, Franchetti resigned
his post and left Eritrea before Baratieri led his army into the disastrous battle of Adwa in March of 1896. The Italians recklessly attacked an Ethiopian force which outnumbered them six to one. In a single day, between 4600 and 5000 Italian soldiers, plus 1700 Eritrean soldiers, were killed on the Italian side; 500 Italians and 1000 Eritreans were wounded; and at least 1811 Italians were taken prisoner. A total of 268 Italian officers died, including two generals. The Italian force had lost more than half its strength.15

Defeat at Adwa called all previous experience into question. Crispi fell from power, never to return, and Eritrea’s military government was replaced with a budget-minded civilian administration. The remaining settlers were sent back to Italy. Land expropriations and distributions ceased altogether. The new colonial governor, Ferdinando Martini, moved to block any future Italian immigration by requiring a sizable deposit from all Italians travelling to Eritrea.16 Nonetheless, Italians still viewed settlement as the primary purpose of colonies. Hundreds continued to apply for land in Eritrea; all were refused.17 In 1899, Italians mocked their government’s short-lived attempt to occupy San-Mun Bay (today Wangpan Yang), south of Shanghai.18 One critic summarized the basic problem of Italian colonialism: ‘Unfortunately the only capital that Italy can export — its large emigration — is useless in China, where the population is overabundant and wages are extremely low!’19 For many Italians, colonial expansion depended naturally upon population outlets; where emigration was not possible, colonialism would fail.
Demographic colonialism in the Americas

Even as Italy’s settlements in Africa collapsed, Italian populations in North and South America continued to grow. It became obvious that transatlantic emigration dwarfed any potential subsidized settlements in Africa. Anti-Africanist critics claimed that Crispi’s communities were forced, illiberal, and impossible, and that Italy’s true colonial possibilities lay in America, where huge Italian populations had settled of their own free will. This simple message rang true to many Italian politicians. After Adwa, Italy’s leading colonialist organizations changed their focus. Since 1879, Milan’s Society of Commercial Exploration in Africa had been the country’s most prestigious proponent of colonial investments. The society’s founder, Manfredo Camperio, proposed in March 1897 that the Society drop ‘Africa’ from its title, because the organization ought to refocus its energy in the Americas. In fact the group changed its name the following year to the Italian Society of Geographical and Commercial Explorations. The Italian Geographical Society also abandoned its African projects, after its explorer Vittorio Bottego was killed in an Ethiopian ambush twelve months after the Italian army’s defeat at Adwa. Instead, the Society concentrated its efforts in the field of Italian emigration, calling on the government to protect Italians abroad.

The Italian synthesis of migration and colonial expansion was best captured in 1899 by the young economist Luigi Einaudi. His upbeat manifesto A Merchant Prince: A Study of Italian Colonial Expansion launched his long career; in 1948 Einaudi would
become the first president of the Italian Republic. To communicate the excitement of Italy’s worldwide expansion at the turn of the century, particularly in South America, Einaudi constructed a narrative around the vision and experience of one Italian businessman, Enrico Dell’Acqua. With his title, *A Merchant Prince*, Einaudi proposed to revive the glory and prestige of Italy’s medieval past, comparing Dell’Acqua to the princes of Venice, Genoa, and Milan: ‘the living incarnation of the intellectual and organizational qualities destined to transform today’s “little Italy” into a future “greater Italy”, peacefully expanding its name and its glorious progeny in a continent more vast than the ancient Roman Empire’. Where Crispi had promoted a historical myth of ancient Roman empire, Einaudi hoped to establish an alternative colonial myth of Italy’s wealthy medieval republics. He argued that the grandeur of Italy’s ancient Latin history could be matched and even exceeded in Latin America.

In his book, Einaudi campaigned for what he claimed to be Italy’s true imperialism; he begged the government to turn away from ‘African insanities, Chinese adventures, and the guilty negligence of the spontaneous colonies abroad, where new Italies are maturing, greater than the old’. According to Einaudi, the actual presence of Italian settlers, not just Italian goods, created a unique fusion of peoples and economies in South America:

We are showing the world that Italy can create a more perfect and evolved type of colonization. . . . The peaceful conquest of the English settlers was always accompanied, even if weakly, by military domination, and old England is now
trying to strengthen political bonds with the colonies; but Italian colonization has always been free and independent. Despite the neglect and indifference of the Italian Government, despite the ill will of some of its diplomats, little by little a strong and vigorous Italian collectivity has established itself in Argentina.\textsuperscript{25}

Einaudi believed that Italian exporters and the Italian government needed to concentrate on their natural allies abroad: the emigrant markets and communities. Risks were high; Italy faced cutthroat international competition, and defeat would mean a future of economic backwardness. But by developing expatriate colonies, Italy could prove the British empire obsolete, and \textit{made in Italy} could outsell \textit{made in Germany}.\textsuperscript{26} Italy could not afford to squander this chance by wasting its resources on military expeditions elsewhere.

Einaudi’s vision of emigrant ‘ethnographic colonies’ became a touchstone for Liberalist supporters of colonialism. South America seemed to offer more promise for Italy than the African Horn, and at a much lower expense in money and blood. Inspired by Einaudi and other Liberals, in 1901 the Italian Parliament created an Emigration Commissariat, together with a large Emigration Fund built from a new tax on passports. Working through the Foreign Ministry and Italian consulates, the Commissariat subsidized secular and Catholic schools, hospitals, and other charities for Italian immigrants. Italian naval inspectors monitored the transatlantic voyage, while the Dante Alighieri Society provided patriotic reading material for the emigrants, encouraging them to return eventually to the fatherland.\textsuperscript{27} Parliament also enabled the Banco di Napoli to establish
offices abroad, encouraging emigrants to send money home cheaply and reliably. Indeed, the Banco processed nearly eight hundred million lire of remittances before World War I. In a separate initiative, the Italian government directed and assisted export industries through the Italian chambers of commerce abroad. These chambers were first created in the 1880s by Italian consuls as directed and subsidized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. By 1911 Italian chambers were established in the leading cities of Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, South America, and the United States. The chambers advised the Italian government on how to boost exports and trade. With economic, political, and cultural initiatives, the Italian government attempted to draw from emigration the same benefits as from traditional, colonial possessions: captive markets for exports, expanded cultural influence, and international prestige.

The informal American colonies quickly overshadowed Italy’s possessions in East Africa. The governor of Eritrea, Ferdinando Martini, hoped to revive interest in Italian Africa by sponsoring a Colonial Congress in Asmara in 1905. The Congress inspired the founding of the Italian Colonial Institute the next year. Despite Martini’s intentions, however, the Institute was conceived to promote not just Eritrea and Somalia, but Italian ‘colonies’ worldwide. The prospectus of 1906 explained that the Institute planned ‘to make public opinion knowledgeable of all Italian colonial activity, whether under direct management of the State in our colonies or the spontaneous penetration in the dominions of other States . . . [and] to construct a permanent bond with our compatriots who live
abroad, whether in our colonies or in other countries’. In line with these goals, the Institute sponsored in Rome the First and Second Congresses of Italians Abroad in 1908 and 1911. From the beginning, the Colonial Institute broadened its support base by putting as much stock in Italy’s booming emigration as in the small, struggling colonies in Africa. Both Conservatives and Socialists joined the organization, in Italy and also in the focal points of Italian expansion in eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Americas. By 1911, the Institute had established permanent committees in Vienna, Constantinople, Alexandria, Cairo, Sao Paolo, Philadelphia, and New York City. Likewise, the Italian Agricultural Colonial Institute, founded in Florence in 1907, with Leopoldo Franchetti as president, stated its purpose as ‘making our colonial activity more industrious and profitable, whether in the Italian overseas possessions, or in countries where most of our emigration travels’.

The infusion of Italian emigration with a colonial agenda, developed with political and economic initiatives from the metropole, reaped clear benefits for Italy and at a low cost. The success of these innovative colonial policies inspired Italy’s competitors France and Germany. Crispi’s cultural policy for emigration, which featured expensive Italian-language schools in the Mediterranean, became a model for the German Empire. In 1896, shortly before Italy’s defeat at Adwa, the German Colonial Council discussed how best to develop the potential benefits of German emigration. The committee recommended changes in Germany’s proposed emigration law, to follow Italy’s example in education
policy:

We must employ means that preserve the character of the German people, through the influence of public and private life, so that affiliation to the Fatherland might remain protected for the coming generation. . . . Italy, despite its less favorable financial situation, spends many millions annually for the establishment and support of schools abroad. The Reich should do likewise. Through schools, we will preserve our language; through language, our customs and family solidarity; and through these, our national character [Volksthum] will survive.36

Germany embarked on a serious campaign to support German culture abroad, teaching the mother tongue to the second generation of German migrants.37 Such cultural programs served clear economic ends. The French envied and admired Italy’s success in developing trade in South America. The Wiener Commission, charged to research France’s abysmal failure to compete on this continent, conceded defeat: ‘Most of the Italians [in South America] are manual workers. But they have become important by their sheer numbers; they have prepared the way for commerce by purchasing Italian exports and introducing Italian products to the Brazilians’.38 The French could only mourn that they lacked the booming population that made such economic expansion possible.

The decline of ethnographic colonialism

Italy’s relatively peaceful, informal colonization found opponents as well,
especially as Italy’s economic and cultural policies in South America began to show diminishing returns after 1910. The poet Giovanni Pascoli called on Italy to imitate the example of Japan: once persecuted as a nation of emigrants, the Japanese had united to defeat the Russians and establish their own empire for settlement.39 The novelist Enrico Corradini, after his tour of South America in 1908, seized upon emigration as the most poignant sign of Liberalism’s failed mission.40 Corradini used emigration as an archetypical symbol, with resonance for all Italians, to translate his arcane, literary theories into a political program for social unity and Nationalist transformation. He conceded that emigration profited a handful of ‘merchant princes’, but only at the expense of millions of illiterate, oppressed and insulted Italian migrants, cut off from their families and from the fatherland.

In essence, Corradini turned the theory of ethnographic colonialism on its head. Far from expanding Italy’s international influence, he claimed that emigration demonstrated Italy’s national oppression and exploitation. In January 1911, he proposed a new ideology of national socialism:

Ladies and gentlemen, whatever you think about emigration, and whatever you have heard, think again! Emigration is a dispersion of our people. . . . Do not judge only by the enrichment of a few individuals, nor by how many millions the emigrants send home to the Fatherland. Judge nationally and consider that emigration is, if I may use the expression, an anti-imperialism of servitude. This
condition of emigration, of the need of so many millions of Italians to search for bread and work across the ocean, and likewise the condition of foreign nations pressing on us from all sides, leads me to call Italy, by analogy, a proletarian nation.\textsuperscript{41}

Emigration justified Italy’s special status in an international class struggle. As a proletarian nation, Italy represented the deserving majority, presently oppressed but soon to be redeemed through revolutionary, imperialist warfare. Corradini mobilized a new Nationalist coalition in the newspaper campaign leading up to the Italo-Turkish War for Libya. After war began on 29 September 1911, Corradini’s propaganda helped pressure prime minister Giovanni Giolitti into annexing the territories, rather than declaring a diplomatic protectorate.\textsuperscript{42} With such sweeping war aims, Italy’s campaign in Libya developed into a long and costly nationalist conquest.\textsuperscript{43}

After 1911, the prestige and political weight of emigration were irreversibly compromised. With Libya as a settlement colony so close to Southern Italy, American migration would never again hold center stage for Italian colonialist politicians. No more Congresses of Italians Abroad; no more plans for Italian colonies in South America; instead, in creating the new Colonial Ministry, the Italian Parliament declared emigration to be the justification for Italy’s African conquests.

Giolitti’s administration presented its plans for a Colonial Ministry long before
Italy had established a semblance of control over Libya. Despite chaos in North Africa, the government hoped to consolidate its domestic political gains. While Eritrea and Somalia had been ruled by an office in the Italian Foreign Ministry, Italian politicians felt that Libya deserved its own Ministry in Rome to mark its importance to the nation. Eritrea and Somalia were not fully included under the new Colonial Ministry until 1922. With the new colony and the new ministry came fresh debate over the basic scope of Italian colonialism. Specifically, should Italy’s vast ethnographic empire, scattered across the globe, come under the jurisdiction of the prestigious new ministry? In Parliament, the panel evaluating the proposed Ministry of Colonies said ‘no’. Their report of 15 June 1912 justified Italy’s need for colonial possessions by stressing the unreliability of emigration to foreign countries. Italy’s Colonial Ministry would administer only the territorial colonies. The informal expatriate colonies would be the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, ‘because a colonial policy understood in this sense — and especially for Italy, given the importance of its so-called Free colonies — is the essence, one might say, of its foreign policy’. Parliament thus established a clear, legal division between two forms of Italian colonie. Emigrant settlements would never again receive the prestige, specific support, and funding given the new African colony.

Following the lead of the Italian Colonial Ministry, the Italian Agricultural Colonial Institute in Florence abandoned its projects to develop agriculture for Italian migrants in South America. When the Institute’s founder, Gino Bartolommei Gioli, had
sought support for the Institute in 1905, he had proclaimed the need ‘to guide our best
genergies for the conquest of foreign markets and the economic organization of those nuclei
of Italianità transplanted on the soil of other countries’. But after the Libyan War, he
declared expatriate colonies a lost cause, concluding that the Institute’s first seven years of
activity, which had included the study of emigration, were but a prelude to its true work in
Africa.

Compared with the Agricultural Institute, the Italian Colonial Institute in Rome
showed much more reluctance to abandon its study of Italy’s free colonies in the
Americas. In 1912 the Institute requested subsidies from the Colonial Ministry for a new
Colonial Information Office and Library, to collect and distribute reports on Italian
settlements in both Africa and the Americas. Before the war, such an office had been
proposed by both the First and Second Congresses of Italians Abroad. However, the
Colonial Ministry was eager to defend its purview of Italy’s ‘true’ colonies in Africa,
against the ‘ethnic colonies’ elsewhere, and responded to the Institute’s request with
contempt:

Even if the presence of a more or less considerable group of Italian emigrants gives
our economic expansion a particular importance in certain countries and in certain
markets, it is evident that . . . these markets cannot be called colonial markets, in
the exact sense of the word, and they are not considered as such by the other States
that, like Italy, have [both] colonies and emigrant groups in foreign countries.
By bureaucratic decree, migrant settlements outside Italian Africa were unworthy of the name ‘colony’. Italy would now become a colonial power like the other European States, rather than creating a new colonialism based on migration.

Nonetheless, ethnographic colonialism brought Italy clear advantages. The spread of Italian culture and cuisine boosted exports to Europe and the Americas, while remittances, together with return migration, were invaluable factors in Italy’s economic growth. Innovations in emigration policy, especially the generous subsidies of Italian schools, hospitals, and chambers of commerce abroad, evoked envy and imitation from France and Germany. Despite these advantages, peaceful Liberal policies in support of emigration abroad could not compete with the grandiose visions, glorious conquests, and bloody vengeance promised by the Italian Nationalists. The historical model of Italy’s medieval maritime colonies, as proposed by Luigi Einaudi, seemed tawdry and cheap beside the resurrected myth of demographic colonialism in a modern Roman empire.
NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association for the Study of Modern Italy’s Conference on Italian Colonialism and Post-Colonial Legacies, held in London in December 2001. I wish to thank the organizers and participants for their comments. I also wish to thank the Smith Richardson Foundation, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Fulbright Foundation of Italy for supporting my research in the archives of Rome between 1997 and 1999.


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15. See Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Rome, L-7 racc. 95, f. 3. The figures I have given are the ‘numbers which the [Italian Army] archive provides to answer requests’. Ethiopian losses were estimated between three and twelve thousand dead. Carlo Conti Rossini, *Italia ed Etiopia dal trattato d'Uccialli alla battaglia di Adua*, Istituto per l’Oriente, Rome, 1935, pp. 447-452; also Nicola Labanca, *In marcia verso Adua*, Einaudi, Torino, 1993.

16. See Labanca, *In marcia verso Adua*, pp. 150-8. By September 1900 the colonial government reached an agreement with the Società Navigazione Generale Italiana, the only steamer line that went to Eritrea, that emigrants had to make a deposit for their return fare: ASMAI, pos. 16/1 f. 8, 26 July 1901, Foreign Ministry div. 2 sez. 2, Malvano, n. 32316. In August 1900 Martini sent a circular to all Italian consulates discouraging migration to Eritrea: ASMAI pos. 16/1 f. 7.

17. For examples see ASMAI, pos. 16/1 f. 6, 27 August 1897; pos. 16/1 f. 7, 24 August 1900; also Labanca, *In marcia verso Adua*, pp. 150-8.


29. London, Berlin, Paris, Marseille, Bruxelles, Geneva; Buenos Aires and Rosario, Montevideo, São Paolo, Mexico City; Constantinople, Smyrna (Izmir, Turkey), Tunis,


35. Printed, generic letter dated June 1907, ASMAI pos. 163/3 f. 20.


The Ministry was authorized by the law of 6 July 1912 and established on 20 October, two days after the public Treaty of Lausanne was signed, ending the war with Turkey. Pietro Bertolini, who signed the treaty for Italy, was named Italy’s first colonial minister.


Ministero delle Colonie, Relazione a S.E. il Sottosegretario di Stato per le Colonie. Oggetto: Esame degli uffici d’informazioni coloniali all’estero in rapporto al progetto di un ufficio di informazioni dell’Istituto coloniale italiano, 9 January 1913, ASMAI pos. 163/2 f. 18.